Abstract
Introduction
A core component of many trusted computing systems is the ability to securely communicate with a remote party. Secure communication requires both the identity and state of the remote system to be determined and be deemed acceptable. The Trusted Computing Group"s (TCG) Trusted Platform Module (TPM) [18] provides mechanisms for creating unique cryptographic identities and for attesting a system"s state using the Trusted Software Stack (TSS) and signed binary SHA-1 hashes of files. Any system intending to utilize these features must ensure that trust metrics are extended from the hardware security mechanisms (secure BIOS/TPM) through the boot loader to the operating system (OS) and finally to the application requiring the trust relationship. In order to verify the trustworthiness of a remote system we created the StaticTrust Attestation Service. This service, built on top of open source technologies for access to the TPM, provide a hardware level measurement quote and verification of a remote system state. Using our system attestation capability to determine a system"s trustworthiness, we created the StaticTrust Firewall Exception Service as a mechanism to dynamically regulate access to protected network services. The StaticTrust framework simplifies the integration of existing TPM related tools and provides a ready-to-use platform for trusted computing research.
Ideally the application desiring to establish a trusted relationship with a remote peer would only have to ensure the trustworthiness of its peer application across the network. However, in implementing a trusted application one must also define not only a notion of trust for the behavior of the application, but also the system on which it is run. Therefore, in order to create a trusted application one must also create a notion of a trusted environment. If the environment is not in a trusted configuration then the security of that system could possibly be circumvented.
When we consider the large number of file versions and configurations that are present in a typical operating system, establishing what constitutes a trusted environment is not a trivial task. Even minor changes to critical files or settings could compromise the trustworthiness of the entire system. The TPM is capable of taking hardware level measurements of files on a system and creating a definition of a system state in terms of these measurements. However, any new or changed file running in the TSS produces an entirely different state.
There is a class of systems that is less affected by frequent changes to the software stack. Communication systems under tight configuration control do not frequently change any of their software components (e.g. network devices, trusted gateways, or high-low guards). These devices can utilize the standard notion of binary hash security much more simply than a system that does change frequently. These systems commonly even utilize firmware. However, even for this class of systems, the open question still remains of how to efficiently take a full system-level measurement and make a secure remote attestation of it. We propose a framework that can exploit the relatively static nature of communication systems that are under tight configuration control and thereby provide an infrastructure for system measurement, remote attestation, and system level identity support, enabling secure communication services to these devices. This framework provides a trust wrapper for communication applications, allowing designers to build trusted systems by simply adding their applications into a filesystem image.
The remainder of this paper is outlined as follows. In Section 2 we describe what constitutes a trusted state in this context and in 3 we discuss background information about the TPM. Section 4 describes the motivation for our approach based on empirical measurements. Section 5 outlines our approach for building a trusted system. In Section 6 we discuss our implementation and explain how we constructed a prototype system environment for trusted computing security for network communication systems in a StaticTrust manner. Section 7 evaluates the security of this system against common computer security threats, and Section 8 outlines related work in the field. Finally, in Section 9 we discuss potential future work to improve the StaticTrust System and our conclusions.
Trust notion defined
Establishing what constitutes a trusted state is a difficult task. Such a definition is very domain specific. In our model of trust, two assurances must be presented: remote system identity and remote system state. If the identity is verified and the state is deemed acceptable then trust can be established. Our definition of a trusted remote state stems from classic integrity models (such as Biba [2] ) where trusting a system constitutes trusting all files on that system, including binary and configuration files. For a system to be trusted it must be identical in every way to a predefined trusted baseline system. Therefore the trustworthiness of the predefined baseline is an axiomatic claim determined at the point of system certification. The characteristics of such a system are not relevant to our model, thus this initial notion of a trusted configuration is externally defined. From this definition of a certified trusted state we build our system. In our model all determinations of trust rely on the notion that if the remote system was booted in the exact configuration as was certified and the system's identity (private key from the TPM) can be assured then the system is trustworthy.
Background
In current systems, the TPM serves as a trusted module, and its trust is based on vendor certification. The TPM has its own processor and storage, which is separate from the host machine. The TPM"s processor executes security critical operations such as SHA-1 hashing, key generation, and RSA encryption functions. TPM storage is comprised of Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs) that are 20 bytes in length; the size of a SHA-1 hash. The PCRs are used to store hash values or integrity measurements of the software that is running on the host. The TPM also contains a Data Integrity Register (DIR), which is also 20 bytes in length and is used to support secure booting. Secure booting prevents a machine from booting if the software sequence does not match some specified hash.
The TPM provides functions for extending a hash chain (extend), signing hash chain values for remote parties to verify (quote), encrypt data (seal), and decrypt data uniquely protected to an individual system and configuration (unseal). A TPM hash chain is an integrity measurement for an individual machine and represents a sequence of files loaded into the system. The integrity measurement may contain a hash of any executable that is loaded into memory and any static data that is considered part of a system"s state. Each software component is expected to measure (i.e., performs a TPM extend) any software or configuration file before it loads it. In TPM-based measurement, sealing is used to ensure that data, including secrets, is only released to hosts with approved software configurations. To seal data, the TPM encrypts data using a key derived from the TPMinternal root key. The TPM associates the encrypted data with the integrity measurement of the machine, and the data can only be decrypted by a host that contains the TPM and is running the same software stack that the integrity measurement represents.
The TPM and its remote attestation function have been proposed to enable a device to authenticate its behavior or function. Remote attestation creates a digitally signed summary of the software that is running on a computer. 1 This summary allows a third party to determine whether the software has been changed. The TPM was developed with the assumption that any change in this summary information means a potential system compromise had occurred.
TPM measurements and approach motivation
In this section we discuss the performance tradeoffs when doing security measurements using the TPM. After recording detailed timings of the measurement and storage of files using the TPM, it becomes clear that there is an asymmetric overhead associated with the measurement of smaller files. This observation is interesting since it provides insight on how best to construct a software image that has a minimal amount of measurement overhead and performance degradation.
The measurements were taken with a Broadcom TPM (version 1.2) using a Dell Latitude D630. The Broadcom TPM implementation, unlike other vendors, integrates its TPM chip into the network card. This integration places the TPM on a fast PCI-Express bus (250MB/s) versus the traditional slower Low Pin Count bus (2.56MB/s). The bus speed inevitably affects the performance of the device. Our experiment consisted of taking measurements (SHA-1 hashes using the TPM) of files ranging from 1 kilobyte (1024 bytes) to 1 gigabyte in size (10243 bytes). At each file size, 100 measurements were taken using a file containing unique content for each trial. For each file, tpm_extend 2 was then called and an elapsed time measurement was recorded. The tpm_extend command simply issues a measurement request to the IMA 3 enabled kernel via inputting file description information into a measurereq file. The command returns after the measurement has been taken. Table 1 shows the mean time it takes to execute a tpm_extend for each respective file size. It can be seen from the table that larger files take longer to measure than smaller files (GB: 9.741 seconds > KB: 0.026 seconds). However this time is by no means linearly related to the size of the file, but in fact there is a great performance advantage for measuring larger files (GB: 100Mb/s > KB: .04Mb/s). Regardless of whether the file size is 1KB, 10KB, or 100KB a measurement taken with the TPM will take the same amount of time.
Furthermore when we observe the plot of file size to TPM extend speed (Figure 1 ), it is immediately evident that there is huge speed increase for measuring larger files. Let us now consider the scenario where we wish to measure two 1 Gb filesystems: one composed of many small 10Kb files and one composed of a few 100Mb files. The measurement of the 1 Gb filesystem composed of 100Mb file would only take approximately 10 seconds where as the one composed of 10Kb files require 48 minutes to measure the system. Further tests revealed that pipelining measurement requests produced some speed up (Table 2) ; however, it did not overcome the vast advantage of measuring larger files versus smaller ones. From these experiments and analysis it is apparent that measuring each individual file is not tractable. Therefore, our StaticTrust System uses a compressed root filesystem image and capitalizes on the TPM"s ability to measure large files efficiently. This measurement efficiency enables us to create trusted boot images for systems of varying filesystem sizes. 
Approach
We created a trusted computing framework to support devices that require trusted communication. Our system provides remote attestation, identity verification, and a secure communications channel between peer applications. This trust enabling environment transparently provides a mechanism for applications to leverage hardware rooted trust notions that are provided by commodity hardware.
We use the TPM as our hardware root of trust and it provides an unforgeable cryptographic identity for the local host and the ability to attest or prove its state. We leveraged existing technologies that were developed to facilitate TPM communication (i.e. tpm-tools, OpenPTS, TrouSerS, IMA). Additionally, we use cryptographic keys stored within the TPM along with existing secure communication encryption protocols to create a remote trusted communication tunnel between nodes in the network. Finally, Live CD technologies were employed for creating read-only filesystems of certified trusted distributions whose trust enabling features were sealed to a specific piece of hardware. From these technologies we built a secure networked environment to present to the application desiring a secure communication and processing environment.
When defining a system's trust level we consider the state of all files on a system not just the binary files in the boot sequence. Therefore we consider a node"s entire boot and OS partitions as part of the state definition. Any data file stored on the system influences the definition of that local system"s state. The filesystem must be preserved down to the byte level for remote attestation to validate. Therefore, a read-only system image is used to ensure that no modifications are made to the host filesystem which would thereby tamper the system. To certify a composite configuration, every client node must be completely configured and then locked. From that point on, any future change on the local node will trigger a software tamper flag on the remote systems. Authorized modifications would require that the certified state of that node be shared with its peers for trusted communication to be reestablished.
Detailed design and implementation
This section outlines how the StaticTrust process is designed and discusses various implementation details regarding StaticTrust components and services. Also a detailed look at the StaticTrust Firewall Exception Service is presented as a method for providing hardware rooted trusted communication paths to wrapped client applications.
We use a standard USB flash drive as our StaticTrust device using a single ext3 partition. All files on the StaticTrust device are measured and PCR-10 is extended with their SHA-1 hash. Figure 2 shows an implementation of using the StaticTrust methodology. This device level measurement includes using the TPM to hash the compressed root filesystem image (ISO) and therefore skip the uncompressed mounted version consisting of thousands of smaller files. Measuring the root filesystem in its compressed form provides a huge performance advantage as discussed in Section 4. The values of PCR-1 through 10 can then be used to seal the system's private information such as application specific data or communication keys.
The aforementioned compressed read-only filesystem, which helps enable full system attestation efficiently, is originally from a security enhanced LiveCD called VMKnoppix which supports TPM functionality. Knoppix introduced mechanisms for using read-only devices (CD, DVD, write-blocked devices, etc.) and presenting them to the operating system as a writable filesystem, by utilizing Unionfs 4 , a RAM overlay filesystem. Thus, the actual filesystem never changes between reboots. Therefore, after vulnerability testing is concluded, a certifying authority can endorse the filesystem"s current state as "secure" and a certified image of the system can be created. As long as the certified system is maintained in its current state, the system remains secure.
In the StaticTrust framework, the certified system image contains all of the information needed for the system to operate, as well as, a configuration script (knoppix.sh) that runs all of the StaticTrust services at boot time. This script accesses a sealed data file that contains all the system unique configurations such as private keys, remote system public keys and network locations of the remote systems in the network.
Private data unsealed
Once the system has been measured (hashed) and recorded, the sealed file containing all the system's unique information is moved from the USB filesystem to / (or /ramdisk). The current root filesystem utilizes a RAM overlay to allow this copy to take place. The staticTrust.tar.gz_sealed is unzipped and untarred which places a directory in RAM containing all private keys required for remote communication, public keys of peers, and network information. The unsealed information only exists in RAM and upon reboot only exists in sealed form once again. Using the unsealed network information the StaticTrust service then sets up the network interface card accordingly and attempts to create any necessary trusted communication tunnels to remote peers.
Remote attestation
Before a node establishes a trusted communication path with a remote system, the node verifies the integrity of the remote system. A remote system"s integrity is verified via the Remote Attestation process, which involves obtaining a quote of the remote system's state (PCR values). The request for this state information is accompanied with a NONCE (random number is a 40 character hexadecimal string) to guard against replay attacks.
The requested state information is returned to the challenging system as a signed quote 5 . Using StaticTrust services uniquely developed to support the full system attestation, the system"s security is then determined based on the acceptability of the provided PCR values and the validity of the quote returned.
The StaticTrust services determine the acceptability of a signed quote by using a special directory that exists in the base filesystem of the boot device. The Remote Attestation Cache directory is manually configured by a systems administrator during initial device/network setup. We assume that all nodes within the network are under one administrative domain and the configuration of the Remote Attestation Cache is an offline process that is performed by a trusted administrator. This directory contains a cache of all the certified valid Platform Configuration Registration (PCR) information, IP addresses and TPM Attestation Identity public keys of the remote systems in the network desiring trusted access to local services. Signed quotes produced by a known and trusted remote TPM, which verify that a client system conforms to the predefined/certified system state as defined by the Remote Attestation Cache, pass the remote attestation process.
Initial configuration
In order to configure a StaticTrust device, StaticTrust services must be running and the device must then be brought into a configuration deemed secure using startup scripts. Once a device is in a configuration deemed secure, a tpm_quote command can be issued locally on that device. The resulting quote will contain the current PCR values as well as the TPM"s public key. This information can then be shared with the peers in the network to populate the aforementioned Remote Attestation Cache discussed in Section 6.2.
Also during initial configuration, encryption keys are generated to facilitate secure communication. The TPM is used to generate the communication keys 6 and these keys never exist in unencrypted form outside of the TPM. These keys are used to create encrypted tunnels between applications for systems passing remote attestation. For any application requiring remote secure shell access (such as interactive X11 forwarding sessions) standard OpenSSH RSA public/private keys must be created and stored (sealed) on the system in an encrypted format using the TPM.
Trust establishment -trusted firewall exception service
After the integrity of a remote system is verified, firewall definitions are changed to allow communication to flow to the trusted client application. Firewall Exception Services are provided within the StaticTrust tool to facilitate this dynamic allocation of trusted services.
All trusted communication between nodes is to be conducted over encrypted channels. There are essentially two types of communication that occur within a StaticTrust System: administrative communication and communication to trusted client services. StaticTrust administrative communications consist of requesting a remote service (port opening) and all the attestation communication that follows. This type of communication occurs over OpenSSL using stunnel to wrap the StaticTrust Attestation Services. The current implementation currently includes stunnel (stunnel4) and an OpenSSL engine (libengine-tpm-openssl) capable of communicating with the TPM directly for private communication key storage and usage. This mechanism ensures that the private keys used to encrypt the communication never exist in an unencrypted form outside of the TPM. If the trusted client application currently supports remote communication over a TCP/IP or UDP port, the same mechanism is used to wrap the communication ports. Firewall rules are dynamically modified to ensure only hosts that have passed attestation challenges are granted access to the trusted client application's ports.
The StaticTrust Firewall Exception Service is the gate keeper for ensuring only trusted systems have access to trusted services. Access to a trusted service's port is, by default, closed to everyone. To access this trusted service a requesting system must connect to the remote StaticTrust Firewall Exception Service with a request for a port opening for its IP address. The system owning the trusted service then initiates the attestation process as covered in Section 6.2 (System 1 issues a quote request to be made with a provided NONCE; System 2 responds with quote information of its state; System 1 verifies the integrity of the quote). After the requesting system is deemed to be in a certified trusted configuration, the StaticTrust Firewall Exception Service verifies that the system is actually on the list of systems allowed to access the requested trusted service (the wrapped client application) by checking a local access list. After the remote system's access credentials are fully verified, firewall rules are then dynamically modified to provide access to the requested service. The StaticTrust Firewall Exception Service uses iptables as its firewall application. However, if the client application requiring trusted communication is not currently configured for networking, remote access can be granted to a trusted application using secure shell (OpenSSH) logon instead of an OpenSSL tunnel. In order to dynamically establish these tunnels (once the system passes attestation) the OpenSSH public key of the clients must be first distributed to the trusted application service providers in the network and added to the respective authorized_keys files. This allows for tunnels to be created automatically without the use of passwords 7 . Trusted interactive user access to remote applications can also be provided using this mechanism. X11 forwarding can even be configured if a graphical user interface is also required. However, in either situation the StaticTrust Firewall Exception Service ensures communication tunnels are only established after the client system first provides valid state and identity information using the TPM.
During system initialization of the system providing the trusted application, OpenSSH daemons are started with the local firewall blocking all incoming connections. After a remote system attestation is verified, firewall definitions are modified to allow OpenSSH connections to be established from the attested peer. This mechanism is slightly less secure since the private key used for OpenSSH communication must exist on the client outside of the TPM in unencrypted form (in RAM) during operations, however the private keys used for identity and state attestation never exist in unencrypted form outside of the TPM.
Evaluation and threat model
In this section, we evaluate the performance and the security of the StaticTrust framework. In our test environment, the StaticTrust System was setup on two devices that were configured to exchange network communication. The process for key generation has been automated, but public key exchange, network definitions and secure state definitions were manually configured. It is the devices" ability to attest to being in the secured state which regulates whether trusted communication paths will be setup. The current implementation of the StaticTrust System enables data to be sealed to a certified configuration, thereby providing local configuration assurance. In addition, the current implementation provides remote identity and attestation capabilities. Currently the attestation is signed and encrypted, thus integrity and confidentiality of the message are assured.
Performance evaluation
The performance of the system can be evaluated based on two criteria: system startup/initial measurement time and trust communication establishment time. System startup time is directly proportional to the size and number of files being measured. The filesystem image in our prototype is larger than 1GB. Before using a compressed filesystem image, our initial measurement times exceeded ten minutes. The careful analysis of TPM measurements times that is presented in Section 4 influenced our decision of using a compressed image, which results in initial measurement times on the order of seconds.
The second criterion for system performance is the time it takes to go through the StaticTrust Firewall Exception process. In our configuration, this task takes approximately a second from the time a challenge is made to when the trusted communication is established. Under a different network configuration, latency could easily affect this time as well as system load; however in normal operational settings neither should be that great of a factor.
Security evaluation
In this section we consider the security provided by the StaticTrust methodology. The security of the system is analyzed against common attacks such as stolen or cloned images, offline configuration modification, hardware attacks, and time-of-use-time-of-check issues.
Stolen/cloned image
In the case where an attempt was made to access data sealed within the StaticTrust framework, we consider a situation where the system image is stolen or cloned and brought to another system. Under these circumstances the data would be as safe as the encryption protecting them. The encryption key used to seal all of the private data is stored within the TPM using the TPM-unique Storage Root Key (SRK). Without an identical TPM in place (configured with the same SRK), the system will not be able to unseal any private data stored on that system. Furthermore, the Attestation Identity Key (AIK) would also be inaccessible since it only exists outside of the TPM in encrypted form (also encrypted with the hardware secure SRK).
Similarly, if a quote was provided by a system using a stolen or cloned system image (as demonstrated in the "Cuckoo Attack" [13] ), that system would also fail remote attestation. Attestation failure would occur since the signed quote provided would be rendered using a different Attestation Identity Key from the rogue TPM, and therefore the public key stored by the peer in the Remote Attestation Cache would not be able to verify the signed PCR values being reported.
Offline configuration modification
Consider the case where an attacker attempts to introduce some vulnerability or root kit during an offline attack and tries to change information on the system. During system measurement, new files would be hashed and thus PCR-10 would reflect different information. Also, if the StaticTrust service is modified, the Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA) within the kernel will measure a different value for the executable. In this scenario, the private data sealed to the certified configuration will fail to be unsealed since the Proceedings of the 44th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences -2011 PCR values would reflect incorrect information. Furthermore, remote attestation will also fail since the PCR-10 value will no longer reflect a trusted certified state. The system strongly protects against offline modification of any file on a certified system.
Hardware attack
The StaticTrust System is currently vulnerable to some direct memory access (DMA) hardware attacks. Consider the case where a DMA device records the information on the bus and has director access to RAM. When a trusted client application requires private information to be stored and sealed on a remote system there is potential for compromise of that information once that information is unsealed. However, in the case where the sealed information is OpenSSH private keys, using these stolen keys from an unauthorized device would not result in a breach of security. A breach does not occur in this case because under a StaticTrust full remote attestation scheme, the rogue system will fail remote verification, firewall exceptions will not be granted and SSH communication will never be authorized. This attestation failure is inevitable since the hashing of the system"s image will be done by a different TPM incapable of producing the proper answer upon a NONCE challenge.
StaticTrust communication is protected against DMA attacks attempting to access its keys. It does this through the use of OpenSSL with a TPM engine ensuring that encryption keys never exist in an unencrypted form outside of the TPM.
The TPM 1.1 was extremely vulnerable to hardware reset attacks using a single wire [7] and after such an attack lying could occur during a remote attestation. The 1.2 specification removed this reset attack vulnerability; however, other hardware-based attacks have been purported [9] . No implementation of the StaticTrust System will protect against such attacks.
Persistent security risks & mitigation techniques (time-of-check-time-of-use)
As with any system that bases its security on the measurement of binary files at startup, there persists a time-of-check-time-of-use issue [3] . The time-of-checktime-of-use issue materializes itself when the system is exploited after the time the security measurements are taken. Hardware attacks aside, time-of-check-time-ofuse is not an issue if no other vulnerabilities exist on the system. This is not a reasonable proposition for large systems exposed to malicious environments. However, for devices with minimized code bases under tight configuration control which only utilizes trusted interfaces this risk is greatly mitigated. There are two levels of mitigation techniques we propose to offset the time-of-check-time-of-use issue.
One technique is to isolate all external communication to trusted parties over the trusted channel established by our framework. This would ensure that access to the system will only occur from a system running a trusted code base. Furthermore, a system"s open communication ports are limited to applications desiring trusted remote communications. All other communication ports are closed. This relegates the time-of-check-time-of-use issue to vulnerabilities exploitable through direct user interaction with the trusted system.
Though the above technique limits a remote attacker"s ability to introduce a change post attestation, it does not protect against direct user interaction on a local system. In environments where this is a reasonable risk, it would be possible to combat this threat by locking down the system to only provide user level interaction to the trusted client application and also reduce the footprint of the image to only the services required by this application. This would isolate any vulnerability in the system to essentially the code base of the application requiring trusted communication. Although, our prototype implementation did not employ this technique, it is possible to reduce the image immensely.
Related work
The goal of attaining secure network communication for secure communication devices is not unique to our research. There are many products and research lines working on different approaches and techniques to realize this goal, however we believe a simple methodology for providing hardware rooted trust for communication systems with relatively static configurations using commodity hardware has not yet been accomplished by the current methods.
Companies, such as BeCrypt [1] , have developed trusted client systems to create secure processing environments for applications on untrusted hosts. BeCrypt"s "Trusted Client" system is essentially an embedded OS on a USB (flash) drive which provides a mechanism for a user to operate on that host in a predetermined secured environment. The system allows for integration with VPN technologies to establish a secure remote communication for the applications on the 'Trusted Client'. The system provides a hardware rooted identification mechanism when incorporated with CAC (Common Access Cards: Smart Cards used in conjunction with a Public Key Infrastructure by the Department of Defense), but does not provide any system level attestation prior to establishing 'secure' communication.
Solutions for the "Trusted Client" limitation of not providing a method for system attestation have been Proceedings of the 44th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences -2011 examined by others [5, 6, 11, 15, 16] . The most common mechanism for providing attestation in a TPM environment is to report a system"s PCR values in order to communicate the hash information of the executables in the system"s boot sequence. However, as England points out [5] , this method can be impractical for "general purpose operating systems" due to their codediversity, extreme configurability at run-time and dynamic nature due to the legitimate updates, additions and configurations. Techniques to address this issue range from system minimization techniques [8] to full image attestation techniques [5, 13, 17 ] to more abstract notions such as property based attestation [8, 13] . McCune [10] realized that system attestation is extremely difficult for large systems and implemented their Flicker framework in an attempt to minimize the code base that is required to be trusted. Similarly, communication devices with relatively static system images overcome attestation issues associated with "general purpose operating systems" since the scale, complexity and size of the proposed framework is much smaller. Furthermore, since the communication devices that we are researching are relatively static in nature, the remote state of the system should be completely known prior to establishing communication and full image attestation is a viable option without introducing a massive code base to trust.
One project closely related to our implementation is ROTI [17] (Root of Trust Installation). St. Clair et al. (2007) proposed this methodology to establish a foundation for high integrity systems. The heart of their work is a trusted sCore which is essentially equivalent to a static disk image configured for the system that provided the boot loader and hypervisor services. St. Clair et al. measure their filesystem prior to boot, using a software-based hash function. We, on the other hand use the TPM to measure the filesystem at boot time, thereby ensuring hard-based isolation of the measurement process. Our solution similarly uses a static image and IMA for system measurement. Our solution does not require hypervisor services, accomplishes system level hashing differently (using the TPM) and is designed as a drop-in solution for applications requiring trusted network communication paths.
Sailer et al. [14] implement a remote attestation and secure network access service for employees who want to access the corporation"s network via an untrusted network. Our work differs in that we focus specifically on creating a trusted image and middleware for static systems that limits the overhead of managing and negotiating trust for client applications.
Future work and conclusions
One area of potential future work would be to decrease the StaticTrust System image size to enhance security and maintainability. One mechanism for this would be to produce a StaticTrust System based on the DSL-N [4] distribution. This extremely small Debianbased Linux distribution (similar to VMKnoppix) could be enhanced to support the TPM and would provide a much smaller baseline filesystem. Since communication devices often have smaller storage capacities compared to workstations, a smaller filesystem would be more desirable for trusted communication devices. This would also reduce the code base and therefore decrease the system measurement time during boot-up. Furthermore, the system state would also have superfluous packages removed, which would thereby remove some potential vulnerabilities and essentially transform the StaticTrust filesystem into a bastion host.
Establishing trust across a network with a remote system is a difficult task. Trust schemes can be circumvented if the root of trust is not completely secret and tamperproof. A hardware root of trust, such as a TPM, can provide the root of trust in an uncompromisable form while preserving secret information. Unfortunately many systems do not lend themselves to the static system definition required by a typical TPM implementation for establishing trust. Communication systems such as high-low data guards, filter boxes and secure communication gateway devices, however, do have this characteristic and are able to integrate with the TPM. Even though most commercial routers do not have TPM access, software routers that are configured on PC hardware would clearly have the ability to integrate with the TPM and also could be configured with a minimalistic static software baseline. Even so, integrating with the TPM is a difficult proposition. For trust to be established it must extend from the very first code executed on the system to the final client application desiring the remote establishment of trust. Through the use of the StaticTrust System much of this integration burden is removed.
